Notes on the Catalan electoral results

naeem19

The 14-F elections have not been able to turn the page on the Catalan conflict. The first place achieved by the PSC, in votes (23.0%) and seats (33), does not allow it to be the winner of the elections or weaken the independence hegemony. The Illa effect has been more than notable, it catapults him to the leadership of the opposition, but it is not going to make him president of the Generalitat nor does it diminish the independence space, which improves its positions thanks to the advance of the CUP. Whether or not he appears at the investiture, Illa will not be the new president. The numbers allow us to imagine the option of a progressive alternative to independence (in its tripartite variant or in that of an agreement between ERC and Comunes, with the external support of the PSC), but no matter.

How much Comunes tries, it is an unviable option: ERC is not going to take a step that would cut the umbilical cord with the independence movement of which it has become the main representative in votes (21.3%) and seats (33), nor can the PSOE support a government led by ERC, because it would offer more ammunition against its Belgium Mobile Number List political position in the rest of Spain and would give air to the uncomfortable competition that UP practices from the Government of Spain. elections results The independence bloc wins the majority and slightly improves its position, but it will have many difficulties in establishing the itinerary and the common tasks and priorities between ERC and JxCAT, with the aggravating factor of the pressure that will be exerted by an electorally increased CUP and that has already announced their willingness to fully utilize the notable differences between ERC and.



And if the justification and program of the new Government will have many difficulties in being realized, it will be much more difficult for it to work and be able to manage the many serious problems in search of solutions that interest the Catalan social majority. Beyond the demands of an amnesty that the Government of Spain cannot grant and a self-determination referendum that it cannot negotiate either, lies the realization of the serious problems related to the pandemic and the strengthening of the public health system, the tasks of economic recovery or the political direction of the changes in productive structures that continue to occur regardless of any type of public intervention. Neither the amnesty nor the hypothetical independence referendum can be starting points or preconditions for the negotiation table or a meeting point for a broad social and parliamentary majority that exceeds the limits of the pro-independence world.