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The case of Indonesia is more complicated and demonstrates the limits of Lovell's hypothesis., Indonesia came under the leadership of Sukarno, a charismatic nationalist who designed a panoply of hybrid doctrines ( pancasila, translated as five principles, and marhaenism, a national variant of socialism) to sustain his position as intermediary between the Indonesian Army, increasingly co-opted by the United States, and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the third largest in the world, without an armed wing and committed to the nationalist government. Beginning in the 1960s, Sukarno compensated for his growing difficulties in governing with an international radicalization that brought him closer to Fidel Castro, Tito, and Mao.
On September 29, 1965, a group of Indonesian officers were arrested Depository Institutions Email List irregular forces and executed in a forest. The operation was awarded to an unknown September 30 Movement. The military retaliation, which brought General Suharto to power, unleashed one of the largest massacres of the Cold War, with the assistance of Western intelligence services. The death toll is estimated between 500,000 and 3,000,000. Even today in Indonesia it is punishable by law to discuss the official version: it was all about an attempted communist coup d'état that the Army managed to prevent.
Both the United States Department of State and the specialist John Roosa, cited by Lovell, relativize the responsibility of the PKI and deny Chinese influence in Indonesia. But Lovell finds the connection in an exchange between Mao and Indonesian communist leader DP Aidit in August 1965, when military unrest with the government was evident and he feared for Sukarno's life. In the version released by the Indonesian Army, Mao advises Aidit to "eliminate the reactionary generals and officers in one fell swoop"; In the version recorded by the Chinese services, Mao says: "I think the Indonesian right is willing to take power, are you just as determined.
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